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According to the twentieth century German philosopher Hans-
Georg Gadamer, a philosophical text always arises as a response to a
question; so, an important principle to keep in mind when interpreting a
philosophical text is to read it in light of the question to which that text is
a response.  For Plato’s Republic, for example, the questions posed are
questions of justice and of the nature of virtue, or the overall ‘best-ness’
of an individual.  Thus, the questions “What is Justice?” and “How can
Justice be brought about in the soul of the individual and in the city?”
are asked in different ways and in different forms in many of Plato’s
dialogues.  It would seem that a good way to bring these questions better
into focus would be to see them in the light of their cultural context.
This would involve special difficulties, no doubt, for ancient Greek culture
is many ways so distant from that of the modern Europe it inspired.  But
seeing Plato’s concern for justice and especially for education in justice
in the light of its cultural context seems not only useful but also crucial
for a proper understanding of his text.  In discussing the cultural context
for ancient Greek philosophy, we do not intend to show a material or
historical cause for philosophy.  Culture is not a cause and philosophy is
not a mere effect.  There is no cause-effect relation between culture and
philosophy.  Culture and philosophy are not separate from one another,
with culture on one side and philosophy on the other.  Philosophy was
within culture.  Conversely, Greek culture was philosophical.  Indeed, it
would be difficult to isolate the philosophical tendencies in Greek culture,
as they were seemingly everywhere, woven into the fabric of daily life as
into their literature, their arts, their political systems and outlooks and
into their ethical views.   A classical philosophical text, a Platonic-Socratic
dialogue, for example, is situated within a cultural framework or world,
which, for the classical Greeks, was divided into the public and private
domains.  (On “world”, cf. Heidegger’s Being and Time, I, iii, p. 61,
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translation by Joan Stambaugh)  It would benefit anyone trying to interpret
such a philosophical text, therefore, to know something about the cultural
world from which it speaks.  We shall attempt such a reading of Plato’s
Republic, Book One, especially the conversations first between Socrates
and Cephalus, then between Socrates and the sophist Thrasymachus. But
first, allow us to make some introductory comments.
I.
Not only for the beauty of their arts, ancient Greeks have been
equally admired for their enquiring, restlessly inventive spirit.  They are
credited with practically inventing the Western European notions of
humanism and democracy.  They are credited with honoring and
respecting the human individual – so long as that individual was male
and a citizen of a polis (a city-state) — in a way no other ancient culture
appears to have done.  They enjoyed freedom of speech and their religion,
being neither monotheistic nor orthodox, allowed for considerable
freedom of worship.  Science, philosophy, free inquiry, the visual and
performing arts, all thereby flourished.  Little wonder, then, that the Greeks
have been the object of much fascination and study on the part of later
philosophers and historians, or that their influence has been seen as
extending far beyond their own time and historical situation.
One tendency in interpreting Greek philosophy and culture has
been to look behind the shining achievements and seek their source in a
social-psychological perspective.  For such modern scholars as Jacob
Burckhardt, for example, writing in the second half of the nineteenth
century, Greek culture and philosophy was inherently pessimistic in that
the Greeks saw the human situation not in terms of religious salvation or
of an after-life, but in terms of the “absoluteness of the here-and-now”.
The Greeks were thus among the first to understand “what it is to be a
human in the modern sense”, which is “to live in the present without
hope for the future”, as beyond both hope and morality.  In a strikingly
modern way, they wrestled with the necessity of human beings to confront
themselves and to affirm themselves in their own radical finitude, in their
own being towards death, from which there is no escape. (The Greeks
and Greek Civilization, translated by Sheila Stern and edited by Oswyn
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Murray, St. Martins Press, 1998, the editors introduction, p xxxix).  Thus,
the Greek love of beauty, harmony, law, and order, was only a mask by
which they looked into the death, horror and chaos that is in the midst of
all human life.  If such is the case, this speaks volumes for not only the
cultural but also the philosophical outlook of the ancient Greeks.  One
could then see the harmony and balance of their arts as a beautiful illusions
trembling over an abyss of death and nothingness.
But this deeply pessimistic outlook can also be seen as optimistic,
if one follows Friedrich Nietzsche’s interpretation of ancient Greek
philosophy and culture.  What is the background to this and what is
meant by ‘optimism’?  Greek optimism lay in its will to know, and so to
master the world around them.  For the philosopher Nietzsche, this
optimism was expressed most pointedly in its Socratic philosophy.
“Philosophy” was, after all, a word evidently first used by Plato and
meant the “love of wisdom”, where to be wise was to know the principle
of all things, especially one’s ‘self’.  Because of our finitude, the darkness
of the flesh and of the powers of our desires, Plato, for one, was not so
optimistic about the chances of human beings every becoming truly wise,
so there was an emphasis on the search for wisdom, and on the quest and
the questioning process, the desire for knowledge, in short, rather than
the actual results.  So, for the Greeks, this philosophical attitude meant
looking at the world with wonder.  Perhaps this attitude was already
detectable in their mythology, which Aristotle described as being “full of
wonder”, but it was especially philosophy that said to actually begin in
wonder.  To wonder about the world is first to be aware of one’s ignorance
and therefore to desire knowledge.  Plato’s Symposium shows how human
beings are possessed by an erotic desire for knowledge, a desire, a true
eros, which carries the human soul to ever-higher domains of truth and
beauty.  Everywhere, then, as they looked upon particular things and
human actions in the world and admired their beauty, the Greek
philosopher and scientist sought their concept, the universal dimension
for all things.  By seeking the universal concepts for all things and for all
human actions, they could then master those things and those actions.
Hence, not only science but also ethical life was brought under a powerful
will to knowledge.  Virtue, in the Socratic view, thus became identified
with knowledge, and implied mastery of life and human excellence
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achieved through attaining both theoretical and practical modes of
knowledge.  These classical lines of inquiry helped open the paths that
would later be followed by modern ethics, politics, science, logic, and
mathematics.  The Greeks thus demonstrated a powerful desire for
knowledge, a ‘will to knowledge’ and an optimism that greatly impressed
such later thinkers as Friedrich Nietzsche, for example, in the second
half of the nineteenth century.  He saw both Greek classical, tragic culture
and its philosophy as essentially ‘optimistic’, in the senses just described.
But for him, the word “optimism” also has ironic, even negative
connotations.  This points out the ambiguity in Nietzsche’s reading of
ancient Greek culture.   In his Twilight of the Idols, for example, he
wrote a section entitled “The Problem of Socrates” in which he describes
the Socratic optimism as the reverse side of a deeper decadence.  With
Socrates, the rabble rises to the top of society.  Socratic philosophy
expressed, Nietzsche thought, a deep contempt for life.  “Life is no good”,
Socrates might have thought.  Perhaps this came about as a result of his
having penetrated into the finitude of life, into the death and
impermanence that characterizes all things human.  But in his earlier
book, The Birth of Tragedy, section 18, Nietzsche wrote that Greek
culture was “Alexandrian” (“Apollonian” as opposed to “Dionysian”)
and “Socratic”.  As such, it was characterized by an over-bounding desire
to know whereby to know was to conquer as Alexander the Great had
conquered the whole known world.  It was also to be thus under the spell
of a beautiful illusion: namely, the “cheerfulness of (the) theoretical man”
blindly possessed by an insatiable desire to know and by the “delusion of
being able thereby to heal the wound of existence.”   And this, Nietzsche
thought, still characterized the situation of modern Europe in the late
nineteenth century. It, too, is a culture energized by a will to know, and
in knowing, possessing, and above all, mastering.
But whether pessimistic or optimistic, classical Greek culture
and philosophy both began to look at the world with a new wonder and
to question the relations and possibilities of human existence in ways
unheard of before them. This has been called their “enlightenment” (a
cultural period dating from, roughly, the middle 6th to the fourth centuries),
and the philosopher, in the form of Socratic man, was an essential part of
it.
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But the relations between the philosopher, especially in the person
of Socrates, and the Athenian polis, were not always so harmonious and
accommodating.  Excessive (hubristic) in his desire (eros) for beauty
and knowledge and somewhat aristocratic or oligarchic in his political
inclinations, he quickly found himself at odds with Athenian society.  He
asked too many questions and the results of his inquiries were rarely
satisfactory.  He was thought arrogant in his dealings with other people,
especially with the Athenian court, and appeared to meddle in the business
of others when he questioned them about the kinds and quality of lives
they were living.  His attitudes about the gods and goddesses were
controversial.  He was seen communing with strange spirit deities.  He
asked about things in a way that was outside of accepted religious and
ritual frameworks and that was implicitly critical of those frameworks.
Although he appears in his last days as arguing in support of the
democratic laws of Athens, addressing them as though democratic laws
were the philosopher’s virtual parents, he was long suspected as being
an ally of a kind of Spartan oligarchy and an enemy of Athenian
democracy.  He claimed (see Plato’s The Apology of Socrates) that his
work, his questioning and questionable work as a philosopher, was a
continuation of the work of the gods and that he had been stationed in
Athens like a soldier on a mission from god.  Little wonder, then, that
people thought him odd, bad mannered, and potentially dangerous.  Little
wonder, too, that the Athenian youth found him so irresistible.
Alciabiades, for example, the brilliant, corrupt, and traitorous Athenian
general, blamed for the Athenian military disaster at Syracuse in 415-
413 B.C., was particularly smitten, if one can believe what he says about
Socrates in the Symposium.  All of this came to a head in the trial of
Socrates that was finally conducted in the year 399 B.C., after the end of
the Peloponnesian War.  Here, the philosopher was charged with impiety
and with corrupting the youth.  These may have been cover charges,
perhaps, because to an amnesty following the end of the war with Sparta,
crimes alleged to have been committed during the war years could not be
brought to trial.  So, these charges were drafted instead of the ones the
enemies of Socrates would have liked:  namely, that Socrates was an
enemy of Athenian democracy and that his philosophical practice was
undermining its constitution and its institutions.  Especially because
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Socrates had so closely defined philosophy in terms of education (paideia)
in justice and in the Good, and because his educational programs were
so critical of the given mythological, religious, contexts, and because he
had thereby become identified with another potentially dangerous lot,
the Sophists, he thus became the target for a conservative backlash in
Athens which had no doubt been brewing for some decades before 399
B.C..  So, in Aristophanes’ comic play, The Clouds, for example, produced
in the spring of 423 B.C., Socrates is shown swinging from a basket
suspended from a high wire as he attempts ludicrously to study the clouds
as meteorological phenomena rather than as divinities.  Caricatured in
the play as the strange director of a kind of  “school for sophists”, a man
unkempt and contemptuous of social conventions, Socrates was also
shown teaching the young how make weaker arguments seem stronger
and, when not doing that, pursuing his nonsensical and materialistic
questions and theories about the natural world (“that there is no Zeus
and that the sun is a stone”, and “how many flea-feet can a flea jump?”),
and finally, and most dangerously, he taught the young how to question
the authority of their parents and even to physically beat them if necessary.
That there were no hard feelings on Socrates’ part because of the rough
treatment he received in this parody of sophistic teachings is shown in an
anecdote repeated in Charles Rowan Beye’s Ancient Greek Literature
and Society (Cornell University Press, 1987, p. 104). Beye relates how
Socrates was in the audience at the performance of the play and that he
even stood up to show the audience how well the mask worn by the actor
resembled his own real face.  But, Socrates also claimed in his 399 B.C.
defense speech before the Athenian court that this play had contributed
to a prejudice against him and that this prejudice was, indeed, the
background to the present charges he was then facing, especially those
of impiety and corrupting the youth. But, whether true or not, this does
pose the question of the wider cultural and political setting for Socratic
philosophy and the consequences and impact that philosophy had within
Athenian classical society.
What was this ‘enlightenment’ that the sophists and philosophers
offered to their students?  The word ‘enlightenment’ refers in a general
way to the retreat or withdrawal of an essentially religious or mythological
outlook on the world and its gradual transformation into a more
Charles Freeland  105
recognizably philosophical and scientific outlook.  In terms outside of
religion or myth, in a discourse that both borrowed from and transformed
the prevailing religious frameworks, the Greek philosophers, tragedians,
and scientists had begun to question human existence in all its relations
with earth and sky, gods and men.   During the Greek enlightenment of
fifth-century, Athens was thus the stage for an explosion of experiments
and invention in poetry and tragic drama, art, philosophy, and science.
Many philosophers shared the perception of human existence as deeply
divided between the desires of the flesh and those of the spirit.  They saw
human nature as defined and determined by its essential and radical
finitude, that is to say, by death and all else that divides human existence
and keeps it from becoming divine.  Deep human spiritual yearnings for
knowledge, immortality, beauty, harmony, and power are evidence of a
definitively human desire to transcend the limits of the human condition.
Certainly, one finds similar expressions of this in other cultures.
There was, indeed, an important tradition of wisdom in ancient China
and India, and in some ways their reflections on ethics and politics parallel
those of the Greeks (one thinks, for example of the parallels between the
Greek Kaloskagathos, the beautiful and good gentleman, and the notion
of the “superior man” or the “man of wisdom” found in the writings of
Confucius or Mencius, or of the ways in which ancient Chinese philosophy
posed the essential questions of good self government, or ethics, and the
relations of ethics and politics, for another). But this should not cover
over the uniqueness of either the Greek or the Asian examples.  The
word “philosophy”, especially in its Platonistic and Socratic usages, is,
after all, a Greek word, and, as such, it is deeply rooted in a distinctly
Greek outlook on life and the world.
Thus, the ‘enlightenment’ promised by Socrates required the face-
to-face encounter of living conversation.  This is how enlightenment was
to be achieved.  Not by private meditation, but in the public conversations
among fellow citizens.  Socrates thus adopted the dialogue form in which
he questions both himself and others especially about ethics and about
the best way for a human being to live. In the course of his conversations,
Socrates must confront the forces of religious myths, and of sophistry.
Both Cephalus and Thrasymachus, from Book One of Plato’s Republic
can be seen as representing these outlooks.  In his conversations with
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them, Socrates was seeking a kind of enlightenment whereby one would
live a better life in this life and in this world.  And this meant a living life
devoted in part to the overcoming of ignorance, especially self-ignorance.
He called it “the examined life”. Realized through dialogue, Socratic
‘enlightenment’ was, thus, a kind of purging or purification of the soul of
Socrates’ interlocutor of all the false opinions it held.  This would allow
the soul to then receive proper instruction in the truth.  So, Book One of
the Republic, for example, shows how, in order to bring the concept of
true justice into view, it is necessary first to confront the forces of ritual
and myth and, above all, sophistry, which stand in the way.  Socratic
enlightenment would thus amount to a turning of the human soul toward
the Good and towards true justice.  Standing in the way of this are not
only the Sophists, but also the many religious myths that formed the
backbone of classical Greek education, (see Book Two for a thorough
discussion of the negative influence of Homeric and Hesiodic myths on
education). These would be the enemies of this paideic turning of the
soul, for they would only reinforce selfishness and fear at the expense of
true knowledge.
We would like now to show the importance of these two cultural
contexts – that of the religious and mythic-ritual culture and that of the
competing sophistic movement — for the Platonic and Socratic ethical
and political philosophy as found in Plato’s Republic, and to discuss
why they had to be confronted by the philosopher.
II.
First, however, some general questions:  What was philosophy
for the ancient Greeks and what cultural factors nourished its emergence
in Greece from the archaic through the classical periods (the 6th to the 4th
centuries)?
Philosophy, in its Greek manifestations, has become associated
with a feeling of wonder and a desire for knowledge.  It posed the question
of being, of ultimate reality, and of human existence, a question posed in
such a way that it appeared to owe nothing to the context of religious
experience.  Unlike religious myth, the first philosophers did not identify
the origins and sources from which existence springs with the gods.  “What
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directs the cosmos,” Heraclitus said, “is both willing and unwilling to be
called Zeus.”  As the young Nietzsche observed, the Greeks sought to
formulate the essential being of existence not in terms of a god or goddess
but in terms of an element, ‘water’, in the case of Thales, ‘fire’ for
Heraclitus, ‘air’ for Anaxagoras, and so on.  Where to know meant to
know the ultimate principles and sources of all things, this knowledge
sought not a divinity, but a material element, something more akin to the
ancient words of Night, of Earth and Chaos than to the anthropomorphic
deities of Greek mythology.  This was certainly a change in perspective,
and part of a more generalized Greek ‘enlightenment’.  But the
philosophers were also looking, somewhat in the manner of the
mythological outlook, for a way to express the seeming unity and
rationality of existence.  The idea that “all things are somehow one” was
an idea with a receptive ear in both the poet and the philosopher.  For the
philosopher, however, this unity, this “logos” as Heraclitus would call it,
was rational rather than religious or mythical.  Access to it was through
thought, through questioning, through intellectual insight and
conversation with others and in the face of others rather than through
religious ritual.
Thus, the philosopher could well seem to a more conservative
audience to be somehow at odds with religious conventions and to be
perhaps a danger to a society in which social and political legitimacy
often had mythic and religious foundations.   A conservative backlash
against the enlightenment in general and against the philosopher was
evident, as we have already seen, in Greek tragedy and comedy.
Moreover, because of the way he questions, because, one could
presume, of the power of his rhetoric and his skill in argumentation,
Socrates was also taken to be a Sophist, not a philosopher, then, but
someone intent only on false persuasions and on rhetorical virtuosity.
This would be a dangerous confusion, in Socrates’ eyes, of true philosophy
and Sophistry, for the latter does not teach truth.  We shall return to this
shortly.   In his Apology Socrates denied that he is a Sophist on the grounds
that he had nothing to teach and that he was poor and had never earned
money for his work.  But beyond those rather superficial issues, there
was Socrates’ more important concern that philosophical education in
the virtues, in justice, for example, was being taken as a kind of skillful
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game that one plays for one’s own benefit.  To this Socrates replied that
his one and only concern was for truth and for turning the souls of the
young toward the good.  Thus, turning the tables on his judges, Socrates
repeats how his philosophical activity, his questioning of the poets,
politicians, and the artisans, was an important way of continuing the
work of the gods insofar as it sought the true grounds for the possibility
of human happiness and well-being, (Eudaimonia, as this is called in
Greek), and to oppose him thereby could itself be taken as a form of
disrespect for the gods.  An arrogant, heedless claim, no doubt, one that
even he may not have taken all that seriously, but one that nonetheless
earned him the cruel enmity of the state.
So, in answer to the question of the chief role and concern of
philosophy, Socrates would have said that it is a true preparation for
death in the sense that it is a mode of taking care of one’s soul, taking
care of the immortal dimension of every human individual.  This was his
path of ‘enlightenment’, which does not mean just the pursuit of theoretical
wisdom, no matter how lofty the latter may seem, but the pursuit of a
better human life in this world.  For this, philosophy was above all
education in the virtues, especially Justice, the unity of all the virtues
and the sole ground for human happiness.  Philosophy’s chief concern
was thus for education in justice and in the other virtues.  It was the path
that should be followed by all who seek the good and by all who seek
thereby to realize the ultimate possibilities of human existence.   And
insofar as philosophy was education in justice and in the good, it was
necessary for it to confront the forces of myth and ritual, on one hand,
and sophistic rhetoric on the other.
Let us now focus on these issues as they develop in Book One of
Plato’s Republic.  In The Republic, set perhaps in the year of 421 B.C.
during the Peloponnesian War and during one of the lulls in that war, the
Peace of Nicias, these issues are again strongly evident.  Socrates is much
younger in this dialogue, yet in the images and allegories he presents in
the course of his night-long conversation with the young Glaucon and
Adeimantus, brothers of Plato, on the question of Justice, he seems to
already know the fortune that is to befall him in the year 399 B.C.    He
recognizes already that the wisdom seeker will be at odds with
conventional society and common opinion and that there will be dangers,
Charles Freeland  109
especially when the philosopher seeks to educate others and lead them
out of the cave of human political life and onto the true paths of the just
life.  He shares these visions with his young interlocutors, emphasizing
the risks of the philosophical life as well as its divine-like pleasures.
But first, Socrates must show his young interlocutors how both the mythic
view and the sophistic views of justice are mistaken, and how they have
misconceived both the rewards and burdens of the just life.
There are readings of Plato’s Republic for which the whole
dialogue is set in a mythical context.  Not only does the dialogue open
with Socrates and his friends on the way to see a certain spectacular
Thracian festival featuring horsemen bearing torches, but also the
dialogue can itself perhaps be interpreted as presenting the mythic journey
of the soul as it seeks the higher, transcendent realms of knowledge and
existence.  The dialogue’s visions and allegories show a journey of the
soul, one taken perhaps after death, as the soul ascends the ladder of true
being and knowing.
No doubt Plato placed the human soul and the care, as he called
it for the human soul, at the center of his concerns, for the soul, he held,
was the immortal dimension of human existence.  So there should be no
surprise in seeing this theme as central to the Republic.  But, in Book
One of the Republic, where an old man, Socrates’ host for the evening, is
shown preparing himself for ritual sacrifices at the altar of the gods, the
question of the proper care for the human soul is raised in connection
with the question of Justice.
As the dialogue opens, Cephalus, who is described as aged and
as rich, is concerned about what will happen to his soul after his death.
He is concerned about whether or not he has lived a just life.  Old age has
its benefits, he tells the younger Socrates, specifically in the ways it frees
the human soul from being a prisoner to physical, sexual lusts.  But it
also brings trepidations aroused by the terrors and tales told in the myths
about what happens to the souls of the unjust.  Greek poetry and myth
were replete with stories about how the unjust are tortured after death
and how the gods reward the just.  What should one do in order to be
favorably remembered by the gods?  Is it enough to perform ritual
ceremonies and to attempt as though in a business arrangement to
purchase the good will of the gods, as though one’s true character counts
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for little and one’s purchasing power counts for everything?  Should one
only be concerned for the just life when one is old and presumably too
old to learn about justice and the living of a just life?  Isn’t it too late
then, when one’s life is over, to worry about whether or not one has lived
justly?
For Socrates, a poor and younger man, it would seem Cephalus’
concerns would suggest that he, Socrates, could neither be just nor in the
position to raise the important concerns of justice.  So, when Cephalus
defines justice as making sure paying what one owes and as telling the
truth, all but the latter component in this definition would seem to leave
Socrates out, for he was poor and by all accounts, cared nothing for money.
No doubt Cephalus represents a prevailing strain of conservative
thought and action in classical Greek culture.  Whether or not the Greeks
believed in their myths, they certainly placed stock in the idea that how
one lived might influence the kind of torments or rewards one might
receive in the next life.  There was widespread belief in the idea that the
soul survived the death of the body.  Belief in rebirth or reincarnation
was widespread, even among philosophers, Plato included. But Cephalus
seems only concerned about the next life, whereas Socrates’ idea seems
to be that one must first get this life right and that if that is the case, one
need not worry about the next life.  Indeed, Socrates only speaks of the
next life in mythic terms.  What comes after death cannot be a subject of
knowledge.  There is only myth.  But, for Socrates, one must live one’s
life as though one’s actions and the choices one made counted for
something.  No harm can come to the good man, he is fond of saying, and
education in justice can bring about a condition of the human soul in
which one can live best both in this life and in the next.   By the time one
is old, it is too late for sacrifices, and little can be done finally to assuage
the lingering suspicions that one has not lived one’s life in the best manner
possible.  Justice and the just life, where these are defined in terms of
virtues and of human excellence of living, cannot thus be brought about
merely through proper business dealings.  They require thought, and they
require critical thinking about what one is doing and what the principles
for one’s action really are and whether they are good principles and how
those principles have indeed guided one’s actions.  Cephalus has never
taken these dimensions into account because, for him, justice is a simple
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matter of lighting the incense at the altars and of purchasing one’s peace
of mind through the exercise of religious ritual.  How one has lived,
what one was in the course of human life can be altered or arranged
through the proper ministry of ritual.  Of course, should one be
unburdened of any fears for the next life or for the mythic vengeance of
the gods, there are no longer any reasons remaining to be just.  Then,
there is only this life, and one should then pursue it with all the gusto one
can muster.  One can then let one’s full appetites and lusts rule one’s
actions.
Socrates dialogues with Cephalus because no doubt he in some
way represents the conventional elements of Greek religious culture.  So,
Socrates, the philosopher, felt obligated in the name of truth to interrogate
and to critically examine the claims of myths and ritual practices to be
guides for human action.  Should one ground one’s life on or base one’s
life on fear? Fear of what may befall one in the next life? For this is what
the poets taught. In any event, the real issue for Socrates is to elaborate a
definition of justice that owes nothing to the rewards or fine consequences
that may come from justice.  Glaucon and Adeimantus rightly demand
an account of justice in which justice is perceived as desirable in itself
and not for its rewards.  This is the challenge Socrates must face and it is
one that is first and most forcefully presented in the person and in the
arguments of a sophist named Thrasymachus.
Who were the Sophists and what were their goals?  According to
Jean-Pierre Vernant, especially three major cultural transformations
contributed to the emergence of philosophy.  First, discussed above, was
the transformation of religious and mythic culture.  Secondly, there were
the economic and technical transformations that brought about not only
the use of money as a medium of exchange but in the opening of new
markets and foreign exchanges and relations.  This brought new ideas
and perspectives that enriched the philosophical culture of ancient Greece.
But thirdly there was the sophistic movement and the use of persuasion
as playing an important role in Greek political life.  As there was no king
or monarch to dictate the course of political life in Greece or to proclaim
by decree what the laws of the land would be, persuasion and skills in
persuasion became more important in deciding the types and nature of
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law to be obeyed by all citizens.  In Greek democratic society each and
every citizen, no matter how modest their station in life, stood a chance
of becoming head of state, or occupying some other strategic role in Greek
political society.  Thus, the sophists were traveling teachers who taught
skills in rhetoric to young men desiring political success.
For Socrates, the sophists were especially dangerous in that they
taught the powers of persuasion over those of truth.  To speak the truth
(Parrhesia) in political contexts was something of a political right in
ancient Athenian culture.  Yet, the sophists had turned this into the teaching
of rhetoric, (speeches made especially to the Assembly and to the law
courts), the art of the powers of persuasion, but did so at the expense of
truth.  Nietzsche showed how rhetoric belongs to a culture that still lives
in the grip of mythic images.  Such a culture, he said, has not yet developed
a sense of historical fact.  Its people want to be persuaded, seduced, by
images and conventions rather than be instructed in the truth. (see his
“Description of Ancient Rhetoric”, texts from a lecture course given in
1872-73)  Thus, there are links between the mythic culture of Cephalus
and the sophistic culture of Thrasymachus.  The sophists practiced and
taught the art of persuasion rather than truth telling.  This is an important
issue for Socrates.  His defense speech before the Athenian court and the
jury of 501 begins by telling the court that Meletus has been so persuasive
in his opening remarks to the court that even he, Socrates has almost
forgotten who he is.  Socrates’ accusers have been very persuasive, yet
they did not tell the truth about who he, Socrates, is. So, Socrates says
that it shall be his mission that day before his fellow Athenian citizens
and before the judges and his accusers alike to tell the truth, to present
himself to the court as he is in truth.  The risk, of course, is that truth is
not persuasive.  So, from the beginning of his defense speech, his Apology,
Socrates points out a distinction, (which, one could suppose, he considered
unfortunate), that truth telling, especially in cases such as this in which
one has been a target of slanderous accusations, was not often persuasive.
The distinction is also implied in the Phaedrus (247d), where Socrates
proclaims, “the truth is my subject.”
Odd as it may seem, Book One of the Republic shows the ideal
of telling the truth about justice as something actually shared by both
Socrates and the sophist, Thrasymachus.  The sophist here, too, intends
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to tell the truth about justice.  He will ‘give the show away’, so to speak,
about successful tyrants and reveal the tricks and delusions by which
tyrant, like the perfect puppeteer he must be, works the strings of the
sheep-like people he governs.  The sophist will show how justice, for the
many, amounts to no more than legal conventionalism, or, obedience to
the law, and which they, the ruled and the governed, foolishly take to be
to their advantage, especially insofar as they are, like sheep, herd animals
and find their safety and security in obedience.  But, Thrasymachus
continues, the law is not to their advantage but to the advantage of the
ruler, the ruthless and cunning tyrant who has an eye out for one thing
only, his own self-interest, which, Thrasymachus allows, he understands
perfectly.  Thus, the tyrant might seem to have perfect self-knowledge
and to have, therefore, perfect self-master and self-possession.  But as
Socrates will show, the tyrant is defined and guided by his appetites,
especially the irrational desire to always get more or to get the better of
everyone, his likes as well as his opposites.  So, he is always at war with
himself and with others.  The tyrant, Thrasymachus says, legislates the
law, changes the constitution, and in doing so, slants and distorts the law
so that it benefits him by feeding his interests.  Those who obey the law,
meanwhile, really end up benefiting not themselves, but the tyrant. Naïve,
well-intended obedience to law, obedience to slanted and unjust laws, is
by far the most economical and efficient way for the tyrant to maintain
his grip on absolute power.  No police force is needed in such a system to
keep people in line.  They are happy to obey, innocent as they are of the
true nature of justice and its apparent opposite, injustice.
This is where the Sophist’s craft comes in.  It shall be the Sophist’s
job to teach the skill of persuasion to others, potential tyrants, so that
they might employ it to create false images of themselves as just and
lawful men so that they can appear to be just before the public and so be
better able privately to practice perfect injustice.   Justice then becomes a
mirror game, a sucker’s game, and a technique in the most insidious
sense of the word.
Against this, Socrates would like to uphold a vision of justice as
stronger, more unified, and more successful, therefore, than injustice.
But Socrates must first show the inconsistencies in Thrasymachus’s
‘truthful’ account of justice. Where Thrasymachus attempts to tell the
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truth about justice, whereby justice is not a benefit to the just but only to
the unjust, and where he further admits that this will work only if the just
and obedient ones do not see justice for what it is but for what it is not,
Socrates must show that this cannot be the case, and that Thrasymachus
is mistaken.  Ironically, Socrates shows that the only way for the unjust
man to succeed in his dealings is for him to be just rather than unjust.
Justice here implies not obedience to the law but cooperation and harmony
with others, the way musicians play together to create beautiful music.
Thrasymachus’s contention that the unjust man will always try to get the
better of everyone, just and unjust alike, is quickly shown by Socrates to
be self-defeating.  The unjust man can only succeed if he at some point
agrees to cooperate with others.  He will need allies and this will require
justice.  Even thieves do not steal from one another, for if they do, they
will be defeated.
So, Socrates suspects that Thrasymachus is, beneath his Sophistic
appearances, a true lover of knowledge, and Socrates would like to bring
this out and enlist Thrasymachus as an ally in the struggle to find true
justice and to provide an account of true justice that will also be persuasive
in that it will indeed turn the souls of the hearers of the conversation and
the discourse on justice toward the good.  Thus, it will contribute to the
education of the guardians.  Their education will be effective and complete
only when it is education in true justice.  Thus, their education will bring
about and maintain a stable condition (hexis) of justice in their souls
that will shield them from all evil.
Again, the distinction between telling the truth and speaking in a
way that persuades but does not tell the truth is strongly pertinent.  By
the tentative and unsatisfactory conclusion of the dialogue with
Thrasymachus in Book One, Socrates has roughly sketched a conception
of justice in which justice is more than merely a skill whereby one pursues
one’s self interests and always seeks one’s own advantage over others. If
justice is such a skill, it will, like many skills, be stricken by the ambiguity
of being fully capable of doing either great good or great harm, as is
medicine, for example. So, justice, too, would be a kind of pharmakon,
the kind of thing that can equally kill or cure.  This is especially the case
where justice, as a deceitful technique practiced by the tyrant, is linked
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to the technique of rhetoric and where the tyrant uses persuasive rhetoric
to succeed in his attempts to get his own advantage over others.
But for Socrates, on the other hand, justice must be seen not as a
skill, something instrumental, calculating, and linked to rhetoric, but as
a virtue, an excellence of soul and practical action, and, therefore, a
component essential to the well being of both the individual and the
political community (polis). Because it is a virtue, justice shall benefit
the just, for it is a life (bios) guided by intelligence and harmony rather
than by the always restless chaos of the appetites.  Justice becomes, then,
a paramount virtue unifying the private and public domains by practically
eliminating the distinction between the private and the public.
The private was always a threat, in Socrates’ view, for the ‘private’
meant the home, women, private lives and private interests.  Such
environments only nourish self-interests by turning the individual away
from the public toward his own private life (bios).  Through his truthful
and hopefully persuasive speech, (logos), Socrates hopes to secure a life,
(bios), linked to the social and to the community rather than to the private
sphere.  But in this new logos on Justice, the bios Socrates seeks is one in
which one’s self interests, far from being set aside, are cultivated such
that they become isomorphic with the interests of the whole political
community.  Justice pays.  That shall be shown in the long account that
follows Book One to be the truth of justice, insofar as a human being can
know it and give expression (in true accounts, or true opinions) to it.
Throughout, though, one should not miss this connection Socrates
is making between truth and persuasion, for what is at issue in these
discussions is the link between logos and bios, between the principles
that one adopts and the life one lives.  This is what everyone must seek
and question for themselves, especially when they meet Socrates. Whether
politician, poet, or artisan, one must give an account of oneself, one must
tell the truth about oneself and the kind of life one is living.  (See also
Plato’s Laches, 187e –188e)  So, the debate with the Sophists and
Socrates’ concern for the difference between telling the truth and merely
being persuasive is a crucial one insofar as ethics and politics are
concerned.  For Socrates, justice itself, both an ethical and a political
virtue, is largely a matter of human life (bios) being guided by right
principles (logos) and rational desires, such that to flourish as both an
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individual and as a member of the political community depends upon
it.*
III.
Socrates’ questions concerning the best life for the individual
and for the political community resonated throughout Greek classical
culture.  In this concluding section, we would like to set forth a sketch of
some of the background cultural questions and tensions that should be
taken into account for a better understanding of yet another important
question one finds in Plato’s Republic, a question as relevant today as it
was in classical times, namely, the question of the relation between the
individual and the state, the private and the public domains.
First, what was an “individual” in classical Greek culture?  Again,
classical Greece is often identified with or defined by “humanism”.  By
and large, humanism here refers the ways in which Greeks put the human
dimension at the center of their concerns.  As was quoted above, “Man is
the measure of all things.”  Sculptures of gods and goddesses were
anthropomorphic – the Greek individual written large, in bronze letters,
and so made monumental.  The bronze sculptures of Zeus found in the
sea, or the so-called Riace Warriors, are all heroic visions of the Greek
individual.  He is shown athletic, free standing, proud, independent, and
capable, as the weapons he brandishes testify. Earlier sculptures, the
famous Kritian Boy (c. 480 B.C.), for example, show at an even earlier
date many of the same features.  Gods or men?  It would be difficult to
say. There were, and not only in Plato and Aristotle, but more generally
in Greek culture, descriptions of the Kaloikagathoi, the beautiful, good,
noble and ‘just’ individuals.  They were those who had realized in their
lifetimes a kind of special worth (time) that was so important for Athenian
culture.  Time-  social worth, or reputation - was wholly in the eye of the
beholder, so it was an important form of the social marking of identity.
As such, the individual as Kalloskagathos was, literally, the beautiful
*My discussion of the relations between bios and logos is indebted to M.
Foucault’s “Discourse and Truth” unpublished transcript of a seminar given at U.C.
Berkeley in 1983.)
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man, the virtuous man who could lead others and lead himself as well.
He was the one of special time, one whose life had become a work of art,
a thing of beauty to be much admired, especially in the poems and myths,
the memories, in short, that would be told about him and his time long
after his death.  So, the conception of the kalloskagathos is linked to the
Greek awareness of human finitude and of the more general Greek
conviction that such life at best is but a wretched shadow of life lived in
the here and now.  The man is beautiful and so the subject of legend and
memory; so, in the language and the words of the mythos, he will live
on, or at least the statue dedicated in his memory will serve to prompt the
recall of what he, too, once was.  Again, a link between bios and logos,
where, in this instance, it is immortal life that is promised for the
kalloskagathos insofar as he shall live on in the collective memory of
the community.  Perhaps this is the worth, the time that becomes the stuff
of legends, that Socrates is implicitly holding out to the young Glaucon
and Adeimantus an implicit promise that, not despite the intrinsic worth
of justice, the just life will also bring about a condition of such time and
such remembered beauty for them, as well.
Moreover, there is a related notion that may help us to understand
the nature and purposes of the Platonic-Socratic dialogue technique, and
that is the cultural and political fact that, insofar as one was a male and
an Athenian citizen, one primarily lived one’s life in the face-to-face
encounter with others, and that to be recognized by others was all
important, and that self-knowledge, a classical and humanistic ideal, was
possible only through others, especially in the ‘face-to-face’, let us say,
of the living conversation, the word, the logos shared with others, in the
eyes and ears of the other. Aristotle’s discussion of friendship in the
Nicomachaean Ethics is quite clear on this point: self-knowledge is
possible only through or by way of friendships with others.  So, in the
Socratic dialogue, wherein one must give an account of oneself, there is
also an ongoing search for self-knowledge.  But, what was this ‘self’ that
was, or that could be known?
According to Vernant (The Greeks, translated by Charles Lambert
and Teresa Levendar Fagan, Chicago, 1995, p. 19), the individual in
classical Greek society was not the same as the individual in modern
European society.  The Greek individual was not a bearer of universal
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rights.  There were no “human rights” in humanistic classical Athens.
Moreover, the classical or archaic (pre-classical period from late seventh
to the early 5th centuries B.C.) individual was not a “person” in the sense
of having a secret, singular inner life that would lie at the foundations of
the originality and the possibility of anyone saying “me”.  As the
discussion of time has shown, everything seemed most importantly on
the surface of appearances.  There being no real inner life, the Athenian
individual was essentially social and community directed. Having no
concept of the private person, the Greeks used the word idiotes, “idiot”,
in modern English, to describe the person withdrawn from his ‘true self’
which was public man.  (see Ancient Greek Literature and Society, by
Charles Rowan Beye, Cornell University Press, 1987, p. 104)  But, and
this will lead us to our next important point, there was in the democratic
regimes of Athenian political history, despite all these communal and
polis related tendencies, considerable emphasis placed on the private
domain.  So, Vernant, in his discussion of this, quotes Thucydides,
(2.37.2-3) where he points out the freedom and privacy enjoyed by
Athenians:  “…. Far from exercising a jealous surveillance over each
other, we do not feel called upon to be angry with our neighbor for doing
what he likes….”  But, in connection with time, there is an important,
socially restraining dimension:  how one appeared to others in the sight
of others was an important part of the calculation of time.  Knowledge,
idea, (eidos), are all sight words, or directly imply the in-sight of
intelligence, and self-knowledge was realizable only in sight of others,
in the face-to-face encounter with others.  So, the Greek individual was
first and above all, a citizen, and the passage of the young man into full-
fledged citizenship and adulthood were important transitions in life.  For
the philosophers, the individual was, most importantly, a public and
political kind of animal. (Aristotle).
Thus, the lead issue for Socrates concerning his debate with the
Sophists and with the poets and myth-tellers is how such logoi affect the
bios of the individuals who hear them.  Plato’s overt concern for this,
expressed in the context of a discussion of the dangers of democracy in
Book Eight of the Republic (557a-c), is precisely that free speech,
(Parrhesia), something encouraged in democratic regimes, would be
coupled with not only the freedom of each and all to tell the truth but
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with the freedom of each and all to their own choice of life. Democratic
tendencies with regards to logos would have disastrous consequences
for both the bios of the individual and for the greater polis.  (“….And
isn’t the (democratic) city full of freedom and free speech? And isn’t
there license in it to do whatever one wants?.…And where there’s license,
it’s plain that each man would organize his life privately just as it pleased
him….” Republic 557a-c). In other words, for Plato, the chief danger of
speeches, and the freedom to speak and to tell the truth, is that it might
lead to everyone choosing a free and private life, that it would thus bring
harm to social cohesion.  (see also Foucault, op. cited, p. 54.)  How to
persuade the citizens of a democratic regime of the dangers of democracy
in which the freedoms promised are illusory and self destructive, and
because of their emphasis on the private at the expense of the public
domains, and how democracies then become the breeding grounds and
hatcheries for the tyrannical souls that will grow to become the eager
pupils of sophists such as Thrasymachus.
Thus, Plato’s great, almost mythic dialogue on the just life must
be seen as written from within the cultural, historical and political context
of an Athenian world that was dynamic rather than static, and that was
endlessly involved in an ongoing and frequently violent debate about the
virtues of democracy versus oligarchy and tyranny.  Plato’s questions
thus seem as essential to ancient culture as to our own, and in addressing
his concerns in this way, we have shown how Plato’s texts still speak to
us today, wherever there are societies in which human beings ask about
the ways and possibilities of true human happiness and justice. For these
seem, the leading questions in Plato’s Republic, the question of the
examined life, the question and the quest that seeks a true account of
justice that will succeed in persuading and so turning the human soul
toward the Good; an account of justice that will show it to be the
intellectual, conceptual principle of ethical life and, as such, the practical
cause of excellence in the action for both the individual and the
community.  In the Platonic-Socratic conception of the just man, justice
will be more than merely obeying the law.  It will be that virtuous life
that binds the individual to the community of his fellow citizens whereby
both individual and community alike will attain to a kind of health,
harmony and well being of soul that is the best possible for a human
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being, given the radical finitude of the human situation.  It is only in this
that one can find from within the radical finitude of the human situation
a true opening to infinite life, not only in that other men will remember
the beauty of one’s life, but that one will also be remembered by the
gods.
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